We describe a new encryption technique that is secure in the standard model against chosen ciphertext attacks. We base our method on two very efficient Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes without random oracles due to Boneh and Boyen, and Waters.
INTRODUCTION
The design of a secure encryption scheme is central to any system that strives to provide secure communication using an untrusted network. In order for a cryptographic scheme to be considered secure in an adversarial setting, it must be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. While, there have been several efficient encryption schemes shown to be heuristically secure in the random oracle model [2] , it wasn't until fairly recently that Cramer and Shoup [13] designed an encryption scheme that was both efficient and provably secure in the standard model (without random oracles) against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Somewhat surprisingly, Canetti Halevi and Katz [11] were able to show how to elegantly construct a CCA2-secure cryptosystem from any identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme secure in the selective-ID model [10] . A user's public encryption key is simply a set of IBE public parameters and the user's secret key is the corresponding IBE master key. To encrypt a message, M , for such a user, one first generates the parameters, VK, to a one-time signature scheme; next one hashes the signature parameters to obtain an "identity"; then one encrypts the message to the identity calculated from the previous step; one finally signs the partial ciphertext with the one-time signature private key to get a signature σ and attaches σ as part of the ciphertext. To decrypt a message, a user first checks the validity of the signature on a ciphertext, and rejects the ciphertext if the signature is invalid. If the signature is valid, it decrypts the ciphertext from the identity determined by the one-time signature parameters, VK. Intuitively, to attack a ciphertext, C, in the chosen ciphertext model, an adversary will need to generate its own set of signature parameters to obtain a valid signature, σ , before it can construct a valid ciphertext C . However, this will cause the receiver to attempt decryption with a different identity than the one associated with C, and by the semantic security of the IBE system this will provide no useful information for decrypting C. Boneh and Katz [8] further improve the efficiency of this scheme by using a MAC instead of a one-time signature. One interesting aspect of these schemes is that they seemingly do not fall in the characterization of previous CCA2-secure schemes given by Elkind and Sahai [16] .
Both the CHK and BK techniques are generic. The efficient constructions of both methods come from instianting them with either one of the Boneh-Boyen [3] identitybased encryption schemes. A natural question is whether we can construct improved CCA2-secure encryption schemes by taking advantage of specific properties of the most efficient IBE schemes secure without random oracles [27, 3] . We answer this question in the affirmative.
In this paper we first show how to build a direct CCA2-secure public key cryptosystem from the Waters identitybased encryption cryptosystem [27] . We construct a CCA2-secure cryptosystem in which ciphertexts consist of just three group elements with no attached signatures or MACs. The basic idea behind our scheme is as follows. As in the CHK method, the public key of a user will correspond to the public parameters of an IBE scheme. To encrypt a message, M , the encryption algorithm first creates the first two elements of the ciphertext, which in the Waters scheme are independent of the identity; next these two elements are hashed to determine a "one-time identity"; finally the ciphertext is completed by constructing the third element to form an encryption to the identity determined from the previous step. That is, the identity that we encrypt to is actually determined by the first two elements of the ciphertext itself. In this manner a "well formed" ciphertext is self-contained in that we do not need any auxiliary signatures or MACs.
We get our leverage from two properties of the Waters scheme [27] . The first is that since we work in groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps, we can use the bilinear map to check that the third element is formed correctly, and thus that the ciphertext is well formed (this is only necessary for the simulation, as the decryption algorithm can do the check more efficiently). Secondly, we take advantage of the semantic security of the IBE system in the full adaptive-identity security model (as opposed to the weaker selective-ID model). When proving security of our scheme, the simulator will not know until the challenge phase which "identity" the challenge ciphertext will be for, since the challenge identity depends partially on the adversary's input. Since the identity is not determined until well after setup, we need to base our scheme on an adaptive-ID secure IBE scheme.
Perhaps more surprisingly, we also show that our technique can be used to build a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) with full CCA2 security based only on the scheme of Boneh and Boyen, 1 which is only selective-ID secure (in its basic configuration). Since in a KEM there is no message to encrypt, in a chosen ciphertext attack the challenge ciphertext can be at once properly distributed and independent of any adversarial input. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext and the associated identity can be chosen before setup when running a security simulation, as in the selective-ID model. Besides simplicity, the main benefit of this construction is that we get a tight security reduction from an already very reasonable underlying complexity assumption. The fact that we get a KEM (as opposed to a complete cryptosystem) is practically irrelevant since public-key encryption is almost exclusively used to encrypt random session keys in practical applications.
The two CCA2-secure systems we describe have advantages over both the CHK [11] and BK [8] generic constructions.
First, our ciphertexts are short, consisting of just three group elements (or two for the KEM), with no attached signature or MAC. For comparison, a ciphertext in the CHK 1 Although two distinct efficient IBE constructions are given in [3] ; in this paper "the Boneh-Boyen scheme" refers by default to their first scheme, i.e., the (H)IBE scheme based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption [3, §4] .
scheme will need to have attached a one time signature and public key. Typically, fast one time signatures schemes [21] will have long signatures lengths and thus blow up the ciphertext size. Alternatively, as pointed out by Boneh et al. [6] , we could base one-signature schemes off "full-blown" signature schemes that use number-theoretic constructions. However, such signatures take longer to both create and verify, making the CHK method less efficient in both the encryption and decryption stage than ours.
By contrast, the construction of BK avoids to a large extent the previous drawbacks by replacing the signature with a MAC, and is much faster since the time to compute a MAC is insignificant compared to the IBE operations; and indeed, the performance of the BK scheme is roughly the same as ours (though BK still requires three to five times as many random bits, most of which are used in the MAC construction).
The main drawback of using a MAC in the BK system is that its verification requires knowledge of the private key, whereas in our construction the ciphertext validity test may be done with the public key. This distinction is crucial for the construction of threshold systems (where the private key is shared amongst decryption servers, each of which can only perform a partial decryption of a given ciphertext). Public key-only ciphertext verification allows the threshold decryption servers to operate without interaction, which greatly simplifies the system. Boneh, Boyen, and Halevi [5] recently described a generic and efficient noninteractive CCA2 threshold system without random oracles, based on the CHK transformation. Using our technique we are able to construct an even more efficient (albeit nongeneric) fully non-interactive threshold KEM with CCA2 security in the standard model, by specializing the method of [5] .
Finally, if we apply our technique to the last level of the depth-( + 1) hierarchical version of the Waters or BonehBoyen IBE scheme, we immediately obtain a depth-HIBE with intrinsic CCA2 security.
In summary, our schemes enjoy the efficiency of the BK scheme, can be used in threshold CCA2-secure systems like CHK, and have shorter ciphertexts than both.
Related Work
We restrict our comparisons to encryption systems that are CCA2-secure [24] in the standard model. There are several efficient schemes that can be shown to be secure in the random oracle [2] model, however, we can only make heuristic arguments for the security of these schemes.
Naor and Yung [23] described a scheme provably secure against lunch-time attacks. These techniques were later extended by Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [15] and Sahai [25] to protect against an adaptive adversary in a chosen ciphertext attack. None of the above methods, however, yields a scheme to be efficient enough to be of practical use.
Cramer and Shoup [13] developed the first practical CCA2-secure scheme that was provably secure in the standard model. Later, Cramer and Shoup [14] generalized their techniques by constructing CCA2-secure schemes from "projective hash functions". Shoup [26] showed how to make an efficient hybrid scheme by using the original Cramer-Shoup system as a KEM. Kurosawa and Desmedt [20] further demonstrated an even more efficient CCA2-secure hybrid system; Abe et al. [1] recently generalized their construction.
Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [11] describe a new paradigm for constructing CCA2-secure schemes from selective-ID secure identity-based encryption systems. Boneh and Katz [8] later improved upon the efficiency of this result. Both of these methods are generic in that they can be applied to any selective-ID secure cryptosystem, whereas our method is particular to the Waters [27] adaptive-ID secure identitybased encryption scheme. For concreteness when comparing the performance of the schemes we consider their construction applied to the Boneh and Boyen [3] IBE scheme.
Organization
In Section 2 we give a few preliminaries necessary for our constructions. We describe our fully secure encryption system in Section 3, and reason about its security. In Section 4 we describe an alternative key encapsulation scheme with tight security. In Section 5 we mention a few extensions of practical interest to both constructions. Then, in Section 6, we focus on the qualitative properties of our schemes, and draw detailed comparisons with related work in the literature. Finally, we state our conclusions in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
We briefly review the notions of chosen ciphertext security for encryption and key encapsulation. We also define bilinear groups and pairings, and state our complexity assumption.
Secure Encryption
A public key encryption system consists of three (randomized) algorithms that are modeled as follows.
Setup(λ):
Takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ Z + . It outputs a public key and a private key.
Encrypt(PK, M ): Takes as input a public key PK and a message M . It outputs a ciphertext.
Decrypt(SK, C): Takes as input a private key SK and a ciphertext C. It outputs a plaintext message or the special symbol ⊥.
The strongest and commonly accepted notion of security for a public key encryption system is that of indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. This notion, denoted IND-CCA2, is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A. Both are given the security parameter λ ∈ Z + as input.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup(λ) to obtain a random instance of public and private key pair (PK, SK). It gives the public key to the adversary.
Query phase 1. The adversary adaptively issues decryption queries C where C ∈ {0, 1} * . The challenger responds with Decrypt(SK, C).
Challenge. The adversary outputs two (equal length) messages M0, M1. The challenger picks a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sets C * = Encrypt(PK,M b ). It gives C * to the adversary.
Query phase 2. The adversary continues to issue decryption queries C as in phase 1, with the added constraint that C = C * . The challenger responds with Decrypt(SK, C).
Guess. Algorithm
The above is commonly known as the IND-CCA2 game. We define the advantage of A in this game as
|. An encryption system is (t, q, )-IND-CCA2 secure if there is no randomized algorithm A that runs in time t, makes at most q decryption queries, and has advantage at least in the IND-CCA2 game.
Key Encapsulation
A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is a cryptographic primitive whose purpose is to securely convey a random session key to the recipient. Unlike interactive key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman, the session key is entirely determined by the random bits used by the sender. Unlike with ordinary encryption as above, the session key is not a message that can be chosen by the sender. Formally a KEM is modeled by three algorithms:
Setup(λ): Takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ Z + . It outputs a public key and a private key.
Encapsulate(PK): Takes as input a public key PK. It outputs a ciphertext and a session key.
Decapsulate(SK, C): Takes as input a private key SK and a ciphertext C. It outputs a session key or the special symbol ⊥.
The notion of adaptive chosen ciphertext security for key encapsulation is similar to that for encryption, except that there are no challenge messages to encrypt. Instead, in the challenge phase the challenger flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and the adversary is given a ciphertext C * and a string K * , which will be the session key encapsulated by the ciphertext if b = 1, or a random string if b = 0. The adversary makes adaptive decapsulation queries (except on C * , once revealed), and eventually outputs a guess b for b.
We refer to this interaction as the KEM-CCA2 game, and define the advantage of A as
|.
A key encapsulation system is (t, q, )-KEM-CCA2 secure if there is no randomized algorithm A that runs in time t, makes at most q decapsulation queries, and has advantage at least in the KEM-CCA2 game.
Asymmetric Bilinear Groups and Maps
Our constructions make use of bilinear pairings. For the sake of generality, we shall describe them in the asymmetric bilinear group framework, which provides for two, possibly distinct, isomorphic groups G andĜ, between which a bilinear map is defined. Pairing-based encryption systems have traditionally been described in the simpler symmetric bilinear setting where these groups are equal, although there are significant practical benefits to consider the more general case (e.g., a broader choice of elliptic curve implementations, more compact ciphertexts, etc.). The security of our systems relies on the familiar Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, which we restate in the asymmetric setting.
Let G andĜ be a pair of (possibly distinct) cyclic groups of large prime order p, related by some homomorphism φ : G → G. Let g ∈ G * and h ∈Ĝ * be generators of G andĜ, respectively, such that φ(h) = g. Let e : G ×Ĝ → GT be a function that maps pairs of elements in (G,Ĝ) to elements of some group GT , where GT has order p (and is distinct from G andĜ). Further suppose that:
-the maps e, φ, and the respective group operations in G,Ĝ, and GT (written multiplicatively), are all efficiently computable; -the map e is non-degenerate, i.e. e(g, h) = 1; -the map e is bilinear, i.e., ∀u ∈ G, ∀v ∈Ĝ, ∀a,
Then we say that (G,Ĝ) is a bilinear group pair, and that e is a bilinear map or pairing in (G,Ĝ). We emphasize that, in our formulation, the homomorphism φ is only used in the abstract definitions, and not in the actual constructions or even the security reductions. The 'asymmetry' refers to the non-interchangeability of the arguments of the bilinear map e.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem was first proposed in the symmetric setting in [19, 7] , and later generalized to the asymmetric setting in the full version of [3] . The generalization proposed by Boneh and Boyen differs from other proposals in that it does not require the homomorphism φ to be efficiently computable, which gives a weaker assumption.
Thus, following Boneh and Boyen, we consider the BDH problem stated for fixed G,Ĝ, GT , e, as follows:
Notice that φ and the elements g b and h c are omitted from the statement. Accordingly, we say that an algorithm A has advantage in solving the (computational) BDH problem in (G,Ĝ) if
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g ∈ G and h ∈Ĝ * , the random choice of exponents a, b, c ∈ Zp, and the random bits used by A. Similarly, we say that an algorithm B that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} has advantage in solving the decisional BDH problem in (G,Ĝ) if
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g ∈ G and h ∈Ĝ * , the random choice of exponents a, b, c ∈ Zp, the random choice of T ∈ GT , and the random bits used by B.
We say that the (t, )-BDH or Decision (t, )-BDH assumption holds in (G,Ĝ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the BDH or Decision BDH problem in (G,Ĝ), respectively.
Observe that we avoid specifying φ in the BDH problem instance by providing selected powers of both g and h to the adversary. Indeed, providing g and g a would be unnecessary if φ had been given. We note that, even in the general case, providing both g a and h a may seem redundant, but it is necessary to preserve the formal equivalence between G and G; it is also harmless since given a problem instance it is easy to tell whether (g, g a , h, h a ) is a legitimate Diffie-Hellman tuple using the bilinear map.
SECURE ENCRYPTION FROM ADAPTIVE-ID IBE
We now present our scheme which is a direct construction based off the Waters [27] identity-based encryption scheme. We first describe our construction and then present the intuition behind its security. The full proof is in the full version of our paper [9] .
Encryption System
Let G andĜ be two cyclic groups of prime order, p, between which there exists an efficiently computable bilinear map into GT . Specifically, let e : G ×Ĝ → GT denote the bilinear map, and let g ∈ G and h ∈Ĝ be the corresponding generators. The size p of the groups is determined by the security parameter. We also assume the availability of some collision resistant function family (but not necessarily oneway). Without any further assumptions, we may use any fixed injective encoding H0 :
n , which by a counting argument demands that n ≥ 2 log 2 (p) . However, since the public key size and encryption time will be seen to grow linearly with n, it may be more economical as an alternative to H0 to substitute a family of collision resistant functions Hs : GT × G → {0, 1} n , indexed from some finite set {s}, in which case adequate collision resistance may be provided with an output size of only n ≈ log 2 (p).
The following description is written so as to provide the most compact ciphertexts under the assumption that G's elements have a shorter representation thanĜ's. An example of this is when the bilinear map is realized as the Weil or Tate pairing on certain algebraic curves, where G andĜ are subgroups of points in the ground field and in an extension field, respectively. If the converse is true-namely, if the elements ofĜ have the shorter representation-it suffices to exchange all occurrences of g and h and then swap the arguments of all pairings e(·, ·) to restore the short ciphertext property. The same trick can be used if it is desirable to minimize the private key size rather than the ciphertext. Although this is not true in general, this trick is applicable throughout this paper because G andĜ play equivalent roles in all our constructions.
The cryptosystem is described by the following three algorithms.
Key Generation: A user's public/private key pair generation algorithm proceeds as follows. First, a secret α ∈ Zp is chosen at random, from which the values h0 = h α and Z = e(g, h0) are calculated. Next, the algorithm chooses a random y ∈ Zp and a random n-length vector y = (y1, . . . , yn), whose elements are chosen at random from Zp. It then calculates u = g y and ui = g y i for i = 1 to n. Finally, a random seed s for the collision resistant family is chosen, if needed (for notational convenience, we always write Hs, and peg s = 0 whenever the injective encoding H0 is used).
The published public key is
and the private key is
Encryption: A message M ∈ GT is encrypted as follows. First, a value t ∈ Zp is randomly chosen. Next, the first two elements of the ciphertext are computed:
αt and C1 = g t . Next, a bit string w ∈ {0, 1} n is derived as w = Hs(C0, C1). Let w1w2 . . . wn denote the binary expansion of w, where each bit wi ∈ {0, 1}. The final step is to compute
The complete ciphertext, C = (C0, C1, C2), consists of the three group elements
Decryption: Let C = (C0, C1, C2) be a ciphertext and w = Hs(C0, C1). In a well-formed ciphertext, the quadru-
will be a Diffie-Hellman tuple, which can be efficiently tested by the private key holder as follows.
Given a ciphertext C the algorithm first computes w = Hs(C0, C1), expressed in binary as w1w2 . . . wn. Next, it raises C1 to the power of w = y + P n i=1 yiwi mod p, and compares the result (C1) w with C2. If these two values are unequal, then (g, C1, u
is not a Diffie-Hellman tuple, and the algorithm outputs ⊥.
Otherwise, the ciphertext is valid, and the algorithm decrypts the message as
C0
. e(C1, h0) = M ∈ GT .
Analogy to the Waters IBE
The above system bears a strong resemblence to Waters' adaptive-ID semantically secure IBE [27] : the public and private keys are essentially identical to the master public and secret parameters in the IBE system, and the bit string w plays the role of the recipient identity.
Other than notational differences, the distinguishing feature is that the identity is not chosen by the encryption party but determined by the first two ciphertext elements; it is this feature that conveys our scheme its chosen ciphertext security. Additionally, all the secret exponents u , u1, . . . , un are retained in the private key, which allows for faster validity checking and decryption than in the IBE system. (In practice, these exponents could be generated from a pseudo random number generator seeded by h0 in order to reduce the cost of secure storage for the private key.)
Again, we note that while our scheme is derived from the Waters IBE scheme, an IBE private key is never generated, since it is more efficient to decrypt directly using the "master key".
Security
We now give the intuition for the security of our system. As noted before a ciphertext in our scheme is essentially an IBE ciphertext where the identity is determined from the first two elements. It is possible to generate ciphertexts this way since in the Waters scheme only the third ciphertext element depends on the identity.
Our simulation roughly works as follows. For all decryption requests of a ciphertext C the simulator first checks that the ciphertext is well formed. This amounts to checking the DDH property, which the simulator can do without the private exponents by using the bilinear map. If the ciphertext is well formed, the simulator creates a private key for the identity string determined from the first two elements of the ciphertext, and uses this to decrypt the ciphertext. The simulator will then create a challenge ciphertext C * = (C * 0 , C * 1 , C * 2 ) which will be equivalent to an identity-based encryption under the identity w * = Hs(C * 0 , C * 1 ). Since Hs is collision resistant (or injective), the adversary will not be able to make any well-formed ciphertext queries that would require the simulator to use an IBE key for the same identity string w * . Thus, the security of our scheme follows by virtue of the underlying IBE security. We emphasize that even though C2 acts only as a checksum in the regular decryption algorithm, it plays an active role in the decryption process conducted by the simulator.
We remark that the above argument is not a generic reduction from the underlying IBE. The problem is that in the challenge phase of the IBE game, the adversary is allowed to choose the identity it wants to attack, whereas here it is the challenge ciphertext itself that determines the target identity w * . Additionally, we note that since C * 0 depends partially on input from the adversary; the value of w * = Hs(C * 0 , . . .) cannot be determined at setup time by the simulator as in previous IBE-to-CCA2 transformations such as CHK [11] and BK [8] . This is the reason why our system is based on adaptive-identity secure IBE (although we will see in Section 4 that selective-identity secure IBE is enough if we forgo direct encryption and meander through key encapsulation).
Formally, we have the following result, stated for the fixed injective encoding implementation for simplicity. Since the formal argument for CCA2 security very much resembles that of Waters [27] for adaptive-ID security, we defer the proof to the full paper [9] .
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Theorem 3.1. Suppose the (t , )-Decision BDH assumption holds in (G,Ĝ), and assume that H0 : GT ×G → {0, 1} n is an efficiently computable injection for some n. Then the encryption system of Section 3.1 is (t, q, )-chosen ciphertext (IND-CCA2) secure for any q < p provided that ≥ 32(n + 1)q and t ≤ t − Θ(
, and where it is assumed that each exponentiation, pairing, and evaluation of H0 takes constant time.
Efficiency
Encryption in our scheme requires requires one exponentiation in GT , two exponentiations in G, and an average of n/2 (at most n) group operations in G which amount to much less than an exponentiation. If the encryption party is to send multiple messages under the same public key, then all but one of the above exponentiations can be greatly accelerated by using many well-known pre-computation techniques for fixed-base exponentiation. (In the same vein, the product Q u w i i can also be pre-computed and cached factorby-factor or using fixed-sized windows.)
Decryption requires one exponentiation in G and one bilinear pairing into GT .
TIGHT KEY ENCAPSULATION FROM SELECTIVE-ID IBE
It is easy to turn our CCA2-secure encryption system into a CCA2-secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). However, we can get a simpler construction with a tight security reduction if we take the lesser requirements of the KEM to our advantage and start from the Boneh-Boyen IBE [3] .
KEM Construction
As before, we let G andĜ be cyclic groups of prime order, p, generated by g and h, and equipped with a bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → GT . We also assume the availability of either a collision resistant family Hs : G → Zp or a fixed injective encoding H0 : G → Zp. Notice that unlike in Section 3 this time the domain of Hs or H0 is just G, and the range is now Zp. As before we assume that the elements of G have at least as small a representation as those ofĜ. The key encapsulation scheme is described by the following three algorithms.
Key Generation: A user's public/private key pair generation algorithm proceeds as follows. First, a secret α ∈ Zp is chosen at random, from which the values h0 = h α and Z = e(g, h0) are calculated. Next, the algorithm chooses y1 and y2 at random from Zp. It then calculates u1 = g y 1 and u2 = g y 2 . Finally, a random seed s for the collision resistant family is chosen, if needed (for convenience, we assume that s = 0 whenever the fixed encoding H0 is used).
Encapsulation: The generation and encapsulation of a random session key works as follows. First, a value t ∈ Zp is randomly chosen, and the algorithm computes the first element of the ciphertext: C1 = g t . Next, it computes w ∈ Zp as w = Hs(C1), and then the second ciphertext element:
t . The complete ciphertext, or encapsulated key, C, consists of the two group elements
The session key, K, is calculated by the sender as the group element K = Z t = e(g, h) αt ∈ GT .
Decapsulation: Let C = (C1, C2) be a ciphertext encapsulating some session key K. Before recovering K, the algorithm must verify that the ciphertext is legitimate. To do so, the algorithm computes w = Hs(C1) and w = y1 + y2 · w (mod p). It then computes C w 1
and compares it with C2. If these two values are unequal, then (g, C1, u1u
is not a Diffie-Hellman tuple and the ciphertext is invalid. In this case, the algorithm outputs ⊥ and halts. Otherwise, the algorithm outputs the session key, K, which it obtains by computing e(C1, h0) = K ∈ GT .
Analogy to the Boneh-Boyen IBE
The encapsulation algorithm may be viewed as a variant of encryption where the message to be encrypted is the constant M = 1 ∈ GT . With M = 1, the first ciphertext component would be C0 = M · Z t , which reduces to the random blinding factor Z t . For key encapsulation, we suppress this component from the ciphertext output, and instead use it as the randomly generated session key K.
Aside from the fact that the above algorithms provide only key encapsulation rather than true encryption, the system bears the same relation to Boneh and Boyen's selective-ID semantically secure IBE [3] as the system of Section 3.1 did to Waters' IBE. The two differ mainly in the construction of the checksum component C2, and the related changes to the public and private keys, as in one case the hashed identity is used bit by bit and all at once in the other case.
It is easy to hash elements of G to Zp using a family of collision resistant functions Hs. A difficulty arises in the case where we wish to use a fixed injective encoding H0. Since |G| = |Zp| = p, it follows that H0 should be an (efficiently computable) bijection, which might not be easy to come by. In reality, we only need H0 to be injective on most of its domain, as long as we exclude the rest by using an iterated hashing strategy until we hit the adequate portion of the domain. We describe how to do this in a couple of concrete elliptic curve implementations in the full version of our paper [9] .
Generalized Identity Hashing
A more general way to enable the use of a fixed injective encoding H0 is to generalize the identity-dependent function in the underlying Boneh-Boyen IBE. Specifically, we can replace all occurrences of (u1 · u w1, w2, . . . , wν ) b is the representation of the "identity" w in base p (or some fixed base p ≤ p), and u2,1, . . . , u2,ν are random elements of G we add to the public key. We then select an injection H0 : G → (Zp) ν , which for large enough ν is trivial to construct. The modifications to the scheme and the security reduction are straightforward.
Note that the number ν of group elements intervening in the above expression is significantly smaller than the number n of group elements that appear in the scheme of Section 3 (and the underlying Waters IBE scheme); specifically, we save a factor n ν ≈ log 2 p.
Security and Efficiency
The security reasoning is similar to that of the encryption system, with one important difference. Since with key encapsulation there is no message to encrypt, the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary in the attack game does not depend on input from the adversary. Since the simulator can choose ahead of time the randomization value t * to be used in the challenge ciphertext, it can therefore determine (in IBE parlance) the challenge "identity" w * = Hs(C1) = Hs(g t * ) before interacting with the adversary. This brings us in a similar situation as in the selective-identity IBE proof of security of the Boneh-Boyen system, which is the reason why we are able to construct a KEM using just the equivalent of a selective-ID IBE system.
The security of the KEM follows from that C2 is functionally dependent on C1 via w. The first role of C2 is thus to act as a checksum preventing the adversary from making decryption queries on algebraic transformations of the C1 component of the challenge ciphertext. As before, C2 has a second role, which is to help the simulator answer decryption queries (except on the challenge ciphertext), by way of the underlying IBE system.
A crucial point to note is that, in the Boneh-Boyen IBE, C1 is based on a generator g that in the simulation is passed on unchanged to the adversary, and is independent of the target identity. 3 In the KEM, this translates into a chain of maps C1 → w → C2 that are preserved in the simulation, and allow the challenge ciphertext to be constructed without cyclic dependencies. 4 Precisely, we have the following result, stated in the context of a fixed encoding for simplicity. The formal proof of security in the full version of our paper [9] . Theorem 4.1. Suppose the (t , )-Decision BDH assumption holds in (G,Ĝ), and let H0 : G → Zp be an efficiently computable injection. Then the KEM system of Section 4.1 is (t, q, )-chosen ciphertext (KEM-CCA2) secure for any q < p, any ≥ + q/2p, and any t ≤ t − Θ(q), where it is assumed that each exponentiation, pairing, and evaluation of H0 takes unit time.
In terms of efficiency, the encapsulation algorithm requires one exponentation in G and one multi-exponentiation in G. Decapsulation requires one exponentiation in G and one bilinear map.
In summary, compared to the encryption system, the key encapsulation scheme benefits from these advantages:
• Tight security reduction from the BDH assumption, since the Boneh-Boyen IBE has tight security in selectiveidentity attacks; • Shorter public and private keys, requiring only O (1) components, by contrast to the O(n) group elements needed in the encryption system.
From KEM to Full Encryption
Naturally, once we have a KEM, it is easy to obtain a full encryption system, where the sending party can choose the message it wishes to transmit. This can be done with a hybrid system where the KEM key is used as a session key for a symmetric cipher with a chosen ciphertext secure mode of operation (itself possibly constructed using a MAC). The benefit of this construction is that it retains the tight security reduction of our KEM. The drawback is that the symmetric cipher requires additional randomness, and for short messages will result in longer ciphertexts overall than our direct encryption system of the previous section.
PRACTICAL EXTENSIONS
We now describe a few extensions to the encryption and encapsulation schemes of Sections 3 and 4.
Public Validity Testing
Recall that in both systems, the decryptor needs to verify the ciphertext before attempting to decrypt or decapsulate it. In our descriptions, this test is efficiently performed using a single exponentiation in G, but requires knowledge of the private key (the exponents y , y1, . . . , yn in the encryption system, or the exponents y1, y2 in the KEM).
In the encryption system of Section 3.1, for example, if the public key had included theĜ-elements h y , h y 1 , . . . , h yn in addition to the G-elements u , u1, . . . , un, then the validity test could have been performed publicly, using additional applications of the bilinear map, by testing whether the following ratio of bilinear pairings equals the identity element in GT :
Since under such modification the ciphertext validity test does no longer require the private key, we refer to it as the public validity testing variant. The principle is the same for the KEM scheme. Public validity testing still results in chosen ciphertext security, 5 but it requires a lengthier public key. It also increases the decryption burden by an amount of work comparable to a pairing computation (the public test depends on the computation of a ratio of two pairings, which, in the case of the Weil and Tate pairings can be done almost as efficiently as a single pairing, by modifying Miller's algorithm in a manner akin to multi-exponentiation [22] ). Public validity testing is used below in the direct construction of a provably CCA2-secure non-interactive threshold system.
Threshold Decryption
A k-out-of-m threshold public key encryption system is one that allows the private key to be divided up into m shares; each share can then be used to obtain a partial decryption of any given ciphertext, in such a way that the decrypted message can be reconstituted using any k partial decryptions. In a non-interactive threshold system, no communication is needed amongst the k parties performing the partial decryptions, other than their (independent) transmission of the decryption shares to the entity that performs the final reconstitution.
Existing CCA2-secure threshold systems in the standard model, due to Canetti and Goldwasser [12] , are based on the Cramer-Shoup system [13] ; their system requires interaction between the decryption parties, due to the fact that in the Cramer-Shoup system only parties possessing the private key can check ciphertext validity, which makes threshold decryption non-trivial. Boneh and Boyen [3] and Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [11] recently suggested (without details) to use the BB scheme in combination with the CHK transformation to construct non-interactive CCA2 threshold cryptosystems without random oracles; the details of such a construction were recently worked out in [5] . Their approach starts from the BonehBoyen IBE system, suitably modified to provide threshold private key generation; it is then generically transformed into a CCA2-secure threshold public key system using a generalization of the CHK conversion, taking advantage of the fact that in the conversion anyone can check that a ciphertext is valid.
By contrast, we propose a direct approach that trades generality for even more efficiency. Indeed, by applying a simple secret sharing scheme to either the encryption system of Section 3 or the KEM of Section 4, and using the public validity test of Section 5.1, we directly obtain a CCA2-secure non-interactive threshold system in the standard model. Although this approach bears a lot of resemblance to the threshold system from [4] due to its roots in identity-based techniques, we are able to sidestep the generic IBE-to-CCA2 conversion (and the signing step it requires) by virtue of the inherently chosen ciphertext security of our underlying public-key construction.
A detailed construction of the key encapsulation version of the threshold system may be found in the full version of our paper [9] .
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
Since our constructions are based on the Waters and BonehBoyen IBE systems, both of which support hierarchical key generation [18, 17] , a natural question to ask is whether the same approach can be applied to directly obtain CCA2-secure HIBE systems without having to resort to use signatures of MAC.
It is easy to see that we obtain the desired result very simply, by extending the hierarchy in either HIBE construction by one level, and setting the "identity" for that last level to be the hash value of the previous ciphertext components. This gives us (in the Waters case) an adaptiveidentity CCA2-secure HIBE, and (in the Boneh-Boyen case) a selective-identity CCA2-secure HIBE-KEM.
With a twist, the same approach can be also used with the constant size ciphertext HIBE recently proposed by Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [4] . One of the features of their system is that it is algebraically compatible with the Boneh-Boyen (H)IBE; indeed its authors show how to design a hybrid of the two systems. In such a hybrid, it is straightforward to design the last level of the hierarchy to be a "BonehBoyen" level, and use it for our "checksum" construction. This results in a selective-identity, CCA2-secure hierarchical identity-based KEM with short ciphertexts.
DISCUSSION AND COMPARISONS
In this section we draw comparisons between our scheme and the other CCA2-secure encryption schemes built from identity-based encryption. Additionally, we describe qualatative differences between the methods of deriving a CCA2-secure encryption scheme from IBE and previous methods that fit under the two-key paradigm as described by Elkind and Sahai [16] .
We begin by examining the commonalities between the three CCA2-secure schemes derived from IBE: CHK [11] , BK [8] and ours. All three techniques follow a similar method in their proof simulation. After the setup phase there are a certain set of well-formed ciphertexts that the simulator can decrypt corresponding to "identities" that the simulator knows the private keys for. The simulator is unable to decrypt the remainder of the well-formed ciphertexts; these can therefore be used as challenge ciphertexts in the simulation. These ciphertexts that the simulator cannot decrypt correspond to identities for which the simulator does not know the private key.
All three IBE-like methods are fundamentally different from those that fit under the two-key paradigm [16] , where a ciphertext consists of the dual encryption of the same message, accompanied with some non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that the two messages are the same. In these systems, the simulator always possesses one of the two keys, and is thus able to decrypt all well-formed ciphertexts by decrypting one or the other component. Consequently, the adversary must be challenged on a ciphertext that is not well formed. Using this type of simulation, clearly an adversary must not be able to tell whether a ciphertext is well formed or not; otherwise, the adversary could distinguish the challenge ciphertext from a normal one. In contrast, challenge ciphertexts in IBE-like schemes are always well formed, and (except in BK) anyone is able to tell.
We now focus on the differences between the IBE-like constructions. We just saw that in these, there are a small fraction of ciphertexts that the simulator cannot decrypt, which correspond to a set for which the simulator cannot generate private keys; these identities form the "challenge set".
In the CHK and BK schemes, the challenge set corresponds to a single identity. The well-formed ciphertexts are defined to be all ciphertexts that include a valid signature (or MAC) on the rest of the ciphertext, which the simulator uses to check that query ciphertexts are well formed. Thus, the simulator has to arrange for the identity in the challenge set to match the identity that corresponds to the challenge it wishes to craft. In both CHK and BK, this is done "externally" by letting the identity depend on a MAC or signature key.
In our full encryption scheme, the challenge set of identities, for which the simulator does not know the private keys, is larger. Also, rather than being dependent on a MAC or signature key, the encryption identity is derived from the first two elements of the ciphertext. In our KEM scheme, we are back to using a challenge set containing a single identity, but instead of using an external MAC or signature key to select that identity independently of the adversary input, we simply relax the encryption to a key encapsulation. In both cases, a well-formed ciphertext is one whose some of the components (including the one that depends on the identity) form a Diffie-Hellman tuple, which can be easily checked by the simulator using the bilinear map.
Essentially we are able to take advantage of specific properties of the Waters and Boneh-Boyen IBE constructions, respectively, to test ciphertexts for being well formed with no additional overhead. However, since we take advantage of the algebraic properties of the underlying IBE scheme, without actually constructing a true identity-based ciphertext, our approach is not generic.
To wrap up, we have summarized in Table 6 a performance comparison between PK systems and KEMs constructed using either of the three methods. The table borrows some figures from Boneh et al. [6] , and also includes the KurosawaDesmedt [20] system for reference.
CONCLUSIONS
We described a CCA2-secure encryption system and a CCA2-secure key encapsulation mechanism respectively based off the identity-based encryption schemes of Waters, and - † The subset product in the scheme of §3 can be implemented as efficiently as a fixed-base exponentiation. Table 1 : Summary of the aspects of the various CCA2-secure PK systems from IBE. When possible, both the encryption and KEM versions of a scheme are considered simultaneously. The CHK and BK methods are each instianted with the main and second Boneh-Boyen IBE schemes (BB 1 and BB 2 ). The Kurosawa-Desmedt (KD) KEM/DEM system is also listed for reference; the hybrid symmetric-key ciphertext encryption it incurs should be excluded for comparison purposes. In determining overheads, the size of any message is discounted to place encryption and KEM on equal footing. In counting numbers of operations, exponentiations are allocated optimally between multi-exponentiations, regular exponentiations, and exponentiations to a fixed base that allows pre-computations. The allocation preference is based on the following indicative relative timings: bilinear pairing ≈ 2-5, multi-exponentiation ≥ 1.5, regular exponentiation = 1, fixed-base exponentiation 0.2.
Boneh and Boyen. Our method takes advantage of special properties of these systems that we use to improve upon previous CCA2-secure systems constructed from identity-based encryption schemes [11, 8] . In particular, our schemes have advantages in terms of simplicity, ciphertext size, and decryption time, and are well suited for threshold cryptography.
